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Using two different samples – one based on newspaper advertisements, the other Internet-based 
– we identify some price anomalies in the used car market in The Netherlands. First, prices of 
used cars depend on their age in calendar years rather than months. Second, there is some 
evidence that crossing 100,000 kilometers induces a sudden additional price reduction. Third, a 
new license plate format, something with no intrinsic value whatsoever, increases a car’s price 
by about 4 percent. We discuss possible explanations for these results. 
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Mainstream economic theory makes straightforward predictions for prices of used cars. 
Those prices should bear a close relation to the expected discounted value of the flow of 
future utility that a car can provide its owner during the remainder of the car’s lifetime. As a 
car grows older, its expected remaining lifetime decreases. The standard model thus predicts 
that, ceteris paribus, older cars fetch lower prices on the used car market. Also, a car of a 
given age with high mileage is likely to break down earlier than a car of the same age, but 
with much lower mileage. Hence, mainstream economics predicts that cars with higher 
mileage fetch lower prices – again, ceteris paribus. Moreover, it predicts that this relationship 
is continuous. A discontinuous relationship would imply that one additional mile or kilometer 
substantially increases the probability of an early breakdown. It is hard to see why that would 
be the case. A final implication of the standard model is that a car characteristic that does not 
have any intrinsic value obviously should have no effect on the car’s price. 
  Yet, at least in the Netherlands, both industry folklore and public wisdom contradict these 
claims. First, when buying a new car one is advised to do so at the beginning of a calendar year. 
In the used car market, a car's age is said to be evaluated in calendar years rather than in months. 
This suggests that a car originally bought in January is considered to be one full year younger 
than a car bought in December of the previous year. Second, both car dealers and consumers 
often claim that a car should be traded in before its odometer reaches the 100,000 kilometer 
mark. Once a car crosses that threshold, its value is said to drop considerably. Third, a car with a 
new license plate format is said to command a premium on the used car market. In the 
Netherlands, a new license plate format is introduced every few years. Since a Dutch license 
plate number is a perfect signal of the car’s age the exact license plate format does not 
provide any additional information. Hence, if such a premium indeed exists, car buyers 
would be willing to pay a higher price merely for the license plate format of a car – 
something with no intrinsic value whatsoever. These three peculiarities, if true, would qualify 
as anomalies, in the sense that they contradict standard economic theory. 
  In this paper, we provide evidence for these alleged anomalies. We thus add to a growing 
literature in economics and finance, that seeks to establish behavioral anomalies, in which 






1 We find that, on the used car market, a new license plate format 
increases a car's price by about 4%. Also, our results suggest that crossing the 100,000 kilometer 
mark induces an additional price reduction that may be as large as 7 percent – but this effect is 
only discernible in a sample of cars that were advertised in the mid 1990s, not in a more recent 
dataset. Furthermore, consumers do perceive car age only in terms of calendar years, ignoring 
more detailed information. We use two data sets to establish these results. One data set is 
newspaper-based and contains data for a number of years. The other is Internet-based and has 
information on prices at one point in time. The effects appear to be somewhat weaker in the more 
recent, Internet-based sample. 
  The main goal of this paper is to establish the anomalies. Explaining them is far more 
difficult. Tentatively, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that at least some consumers 
are unable or unwilling to use the exact information they receive. Instead, they use rough proxies 
like year of birth. This leads to systematic biases in the prices of used cars. Intriguingly, the most 
convincing explanation of the plate effect we find is that car buyers want others to infer that their 
car is newer than it really is. However, to firmly establish these or any other explanations, further 
research is obviously needed. 
  There is a wealth of papers studying the prices of cars. A substantial recent literature was 
triggered by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Yet, this literature tends to look only at the 
prices of new cars. Papers that do look at the used car market do not allow the anomalies we 
study in this paper, but primarily focus on testing Akerlof’s (1970) adverse selection model.
2 
One related paper is Pashigian, Bowen, and Gould (1995). They find that in the 1980s new cars 
sell for about 2% more at the start of the model year (November) than they do at the end 
(October). They explain this as a fashion effect: when new models appear, car manufacturers are 
able to charge a premium to fashion-conscious early adopters. Note however that this effect is 
different from the premium for cars born
3 at the beginning of the year that we find. The fact that 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for being among the first to drive a certain model does 
not imply that buyers of used cars would also be willing to a pay a premium for a car that 
originally was among the first. 
  The only economic analyses of license plates we are aware of involve personalized license 
                     
1 See e.g. Thaler (1994) and Shleifer (2000). 
2 See e.g. Bond (1982), Genesove (1993), or Emons and Sheldon (2002). 





plates. Vehicle owners in e.g. some US states can purchase the right to choose the sequence of 
symbols that will appear on their “vanity license plate”. Alper, Archibald and Jensen (1987) 
estimate the elasticity of the demand for these plates and conclude that most states set a price 
higher than the profit-maximizing one. Harrington and Krynski (1989) find a similar result. Woo 
and Kwok (1994) find that in Hong Kong, where some desirable license plates are auctioned, 
plates that contain lucky numbers command a premium, while those with unlucky numbers carry 
a discount. Biddle (1991) analyzes whether there is a bandwagon effect in personalized license 
plates. Bandwagon effects (see Leibenstein (1950)) are said to exist if peoples' valuations of a 
good increases when they observe others consuming the good. Biddle does find that the demand 
for personalized license plates is positively related to total demand in the previous period. 
However, as noted by the author, the effect can also be explained by a diffusion model, in which 
demand for a new product grows as information about or awareness of the new product spreads. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 takes a more in-depth look at the way in which 
license plates are issued in the Netherlands. In section 3, we develop a theoretic framework for 
the value of a used car. Section 4 describes our data. Estimation results are reported in section 5. 
Section 6 discusses possible interpretations of our findings, and concludes. 
 
 
2. Dutch License Plates 
 
One of the issues we study in this paper is the effect of the license plate format on the price of 
a used car. To appreciate this effect, some background information is needed on the way 
license plates are issued in the Netherlands. In this section, we provide that information.  
  In The Netherlands cars are identified by license plates which are issued when the car is 
sold to its first owner. The license plate number does not change at resale and remains with 
the car throughout its life. New plates are issued in alphabetical order. As a consequence, it is 
possible to deduce the age of any car from its license plate number with a one month 
precision.
4 
  In September 1991 the format on the plates for new cars changed. Cars that were bought 
                     
4 There is an exception for imported used cars. For such cars a new (Dutch) license plate is issued when it enters 





before that date have a license plate with format XX-##-XX, where each X denotes a letter
5 
and each # a one-digit integer. The format of cars bought after September 1991 is XX-XX-
##. Prior to the change car dealers reported a drop in sales of new cars, and suggested that 
this was due to the fact that many potential buyers waited for the new format. Responding to 
pressure from the automobile industry, the State Agency for Road Traffic decided to expedite 
the introduction of the new format. The introduction received ample attention from the 
media. Prime time news programs featured the Minister of Transportation showing the first 
plate of the new format.  
  In June 1999 the format changed again, now from XX-XX-## to ##-XX-XX. In an attempt 
to minimize the effect on sales the State Agency for Road Traffic did not provide any 
information on the exact timing of the new change of format. Consumers were assured that the 
license plate format would not have any effect on the resale value of their car. The change 
occurred earlier than expected, well before all possible combinations of format XX-XX-## 
were exhausted. 
6 
  These stories suggest that, other things equal, consumers prefer a new license plate format. 
This may be because a car owner likes a new plate per se, or because he expects that future 
buyers of used cars will. Note that the order of letters and numbers on a plate provides a crude 
but simple and cheap informational signal about the car's age
7. To determine the exact car age, 
most people would have to consult additional sources of information (e.g. websites like 
http://www.hektra.nl/info/kenteken.html). 
  The price of a new car does not depend on the license plate format that is attached to it. 
However, if consumers value the license plate format, this should be reflected in the prices of 
used cars. The license plate format uniquely identifies any Dutch car as belonging to one of three 
subsequent cohorts of cars:
8 those with format XX-##-XX date from August 1991 or before, 
those with format XX-XX-## are from the period September 1991 up to and including May 
1999, and those with format ##-XX-XX are from June 1999 or more recent. As a consequence, 
                     
5 Only consonants are used. Combinations starting with B and V are reserved for commercial vehicles, those 
starting with M are reserved for motorcycles. C, K, Q, and W are not used, since their resemblance to other let-
ters is too close. 
6 The last plate issued of the old format started with ZN. Hence, plates starting with ZP through ZZ were never 
used.   
7 Law requires that cars have license plates on both the front and the rear side. Plates and characters on plates are 
about 25 percent larger than in the US. 





at given point in time the license plate format puts bounds on the car's age. For example, in May 
2001, we know that a car with format XX-XX-## is at least two and at most nine years old. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
As we argued in the introduction, according to standard economic theory, the price a consumer is 
willing to pay for a used car should equal the expected discounted value of future utility that a 
car can provide during the remainder of the car’s lifetime. We will refer to the latter as the 
intrinsic value of the car, which does not necessarily equal the market value, which is the price 
on the second-hand market. Consider the instantaneous utility that a consumer obtains from 
owning a car at a given point in time. The intrinsic value of the car then equals the expected 
discounted value of all future instantaneous utilities.
9  
  For simplicity, we assume that all consumers have the same preferences, and hence have 
the same instantaneous utility functions. This is just for expositional convencience; for our 
results, it is immaterial. With perfect competition, the market value will then equal the intrin-
sic value. We assume that instantaneous utility is decreasing in mileage: as a car has higher 
mileage, it is more likely to break down, hence the expected utility that one can derive from 
it, is lower. Also, we assume that instantaneous utility is either constant or decreasing in the 
age of the car. This immediately implies that the market value of the car is also decreasing in 
its age. 
  When the market value of used cars does not satisfy this standard model, we will consider 
this an anomaly. More specifically, the model predicts the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (no year effect) The age of a car is evaluated in months rather than calendar years. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (no 100,000 km effect) Crossing the 100,000 km threshold does not lead to a 
discrete drop in a car’s value. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (no plate effect) A new license plate format has no effect on the value of a given 
                                                                







  Hypothesis 1 is straightforward. Our model immediately implies that the intrinsic value of 
a car is a continuous and decreasing function of its age. The age information that consumers 
possess when they buy a used car concerns the month in which the car was born. Hence, 
when determining the intrinsic value of a used car, consumers should take that information 
into account, and not base the value merely on the year in which the car was built. 
  Hypothesis 2 is more subtle. Note that it does not preclude that there may be discrete drop 
in instantaneous utility from owning a car that has run for over 100,000 km. When determin-
ing the intrinsic value of a car, a rational consumer always takes into account that there will 
be such a drop in instantaneous utility in the future. For example, a rational consumer that 
buys a car that has run for 95,000 kilometers will realize that this car will yield much lower in-
stantaneous utility after only another 5,000 kilometers, and will take this into account when de-
termining the intrinsic value of that car. As a result, the intrinsic value of a car is a continuous 
function of mileage, which implies the second hypothesis. 
  For hypothesis 3, note that a plate effect would imply that consumers systematically attach 
a higher value to a car that has a new plate. Two otherwise identical cars then have a different 
value, purely based on the license plate that has been attached. As this plate has no effect 
whatsoever on the intrinsic utility of the car, this would be an anomalous event from the point 
of view of the theory set out above. 
 
 
4. The data 
 
  Our analysis requires detailed data on individual transactions in the used car market. The first 
sample (sample A) is based on advertisements in local newspapers in the Dutch province of 
Utrecht between January 1992 and December 1998 (with advertised cars from cohorts 1986 
up to 1997). Cars can be included in the sample only if the advertisements at least contain 
information on car make and model, year and month of car cohort (which is the date of "car 
birth"), the price, and some other main price determinants (engine volume, number of 
                                                                





kilometers driven, and automatic/manual transmission). We selected the advertisements by 
three certified Peugeot car dealers since their ads consistently contained all necessary 
information and showed substantial variety in terms of models. The sample contains 
information on Peugeots 106 and 205 (small), 309 and 405 (medium), and 605 (large), with a 
total of 462 observations.  
  The second sample (sample B) is based on the Internet site autoonline.nl, set up by RDC 
and Autodata. These are centers that collect data on transactions and the supply of used cars at 
almost all car dealers in the Netherlands. At the beginning of 2000, this website listed all used 
cars offered for sale at 1,100 dealers throughout the country (see RDC, 2000). Note that the 
website merely lists these cars, and offers some selection facilities. Consumers still need to go to 
the dealer to buy the car, without having to reveal that they saw the car listed on the web. Thus, 
autoonline.nl is not a referral site, as is the case for most websites in the US offering used 
cars (see e.g. Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Risso, 2001). 
  In the first two weeks of 2001 we took a sample of 443 cars from autoonline.nl.
10 The site 
reports all information required for our analysis, including cohort month. Sample B contains data 
on a larger variety of car makes: Peugeot 406 (medium), Nissan Primera (medium), and Audi A6 
(large). The main reasons for choosing these cars was that they were advertised often enough to 
allow us to create a relatively homogeneous sample. Also, in the cohort periods we consider 
there were no modifications in the specifications of these car models. 
  In both samples, the price that we observe is the price asked by the car dealer, which is not 
necessarily the price that is actually paid. Consider a regression with the ln of the asking price as 
the dependent variable. Suppose that p=λs, 0 < λ ≤  1, where p is the actual price and s the asking 
price. When λ is a random variable independent of the included regressors, using s rather than p 
will not affect the regression coefficients, except for the constant term.
11 Moreover, when setting 
prices car dealers usually consult a database that gives the average price actually paid for a 
particular type of car, based on a large number of recent transactions nationwide. Therefore, 
asking prices and actual prices will be closely related, if not identical. Finally, even if 
information on actual prices would be available, its interpretation would be hampered by the fact 
                     
10 Since we had no permission for automated access to the data, the information was secured manually by sepa-
rately clicking on each observation and storing it into a data file. 
11 If λ is uncorrelated with the vector of independent variables X, and the true relationship is ln p = α + βX, then 





that most transactions involve a trade-in. 
  There are some notable differences between the two data sets. First, sample A contains 
observations on cars that were advertised during a seven year period, whereas the cars in sample 
B were all advertised at the same point in time. Second, cars in sample A are older on average 
than cars in sample B (48 versus 31 months; see tables 3 and 4 in the appendix); in sample A, 25 
percent of the cars had more than 100,000 kilometers on the odometer, compared to only 6 
percent in sample B. Third, the cars in sample B have larger engines and are more frequently 
equipped with automatic transmission. The cohort data in both samples show a remarkable 
seasonal pattern (see tables 3 and 4 in the appendix, and the top panels of figures 3 and 4, also in 
the appendix). Roughly fifty percent of the cars were ‘born’ in the first quarter of a calendar year, 
and the percentages for subsequent quarters decline sharply.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Estimation strategy 
 
This section describes the results of our empirical analysis. We estimate equations with ln price 
as the dependent variable. To explain price, we include the obvious variables that are generally 
believed to influence the value of a used car. These include the age of the car in months, the 
number of kilometers driven, engine volume and dummies for the type or model of the car. 
Moreover, we include variables to test for the hypotheses set out in section 3. 
  In our regression, we include the age of the car in months as an explanatory variable. When 
consumers do indeed evaluate the age of a car in months, then the entire effect of age on value 
should be captured by our age-in-months variable. In that case, dummy variables for whether a 
car was born early or late in the year should not add any explanatory power. A 14-month old car 
born in January should have the exact same value as a 14-month old car born in December. If, 
however, consumers evaluate the age of a car in calendar years rather than months, then we 
should find that cars born early in the year do have a higher value than what one would expect 
merely on the basis of their age in months. In that case, a 14-month old car born in January (but 





December (with an age of two calendar years). Therefore, if hypothesis 1 is true, then dummies 
that indicate that a car is born early in a calendar year, should have a zero value in our regression 
where age is measured in months. On the other hand, if consumers do evaluate the age in 
calender years, then we would expect the value of such dummies to be significantly positive. 
  Hypothesis 2 is more straightforward to test. If it is true, a dummy that indicates whether a car 
has crossed the 100,000 km mark, should have a zero value in a regression where the effect of 
kilometrage is already taken into account. Hypothesis 3 implies that a car that was born after the 
introduction of a new license plate format, should have the same value as a car that was born 
before that introduction, but which is identical in every other respect. 
  We study both samples separately. To get a feel for the data, and to allow for as much 
flexibility as possible in parameterizing the cohort effects, we initially use dummy variables for 
each four-month period in sample A, and for each two-month period in sample B. We also use 
dummies for each 10,000 km interval in sample A, and for each 20,000 km interval in sample B. 
We then plot the values of all dummies to get a feel for the general patterns that are present in 
our data. We also plot the corresponding frequencies of the cohorts and intervals. Finally, we 
aggregate cohort and interval dummies to formally test our hypotheses. 
  
5.2 Results for sample A 
 
Estimation results for sample A are reported in table 1. In column I, we use dummy variables for 
each four-month period (or trimester), with January-April 1986 as reference period. Since the 
new plate was introduced in September 1991, partitioning the data in trimesters rather than 
quarters allows us to most clearly discern the possible effect of a new license plate format. 
Similarly, we use 10,000 kilometer interval dummies (with 0-10,000 as reference category) to 
parameterize the kilometer effects. 
  In the top panel of figure 1, we have plotted the values of the cohort dummies. As the age in 
months is also included in the regression, our theory predicts that all these dummies have a value 
equal to zero. At first sight, the coefficients seem to show a rather erratic pattern. Most of the 32 
coefficients are insignificant at the 5 percent level. Upon closer inspection, however, some 
general patterns emerge. If consumers evaluate the value of a car in calendar years rather than 












































































































































The top panel gives the value of the cohort dummies in the regression in the first column of table 1. Numbers on the 
horizontal axis denote trimesters. For example, 2-92 refers to the period May-August 1992. The bottom panel gives the 
value of the kilometer dummies in the same regression. In each panel, the straight curve is the estimated one: the dotted 

























































































































should be higher than that for the second, which should again be higher than that for the third 
trimester. Also, we would expect the dummy for a third trimester to be lower than that of the first 
trimester of the following year. These patterns indeed seem to hold for many years – especially 
in the middle of our sample, where we have the highest number of observations. Note that this 
seems to contradict hypothesis 1. The most notable exception of the general pattern sketched 
above is trimester 3-91. The dummy for this trimester has the highest value of all third-trimester 
dummies. The dummy for the next trimester, 1-92, has the highest value of all first-trimester 
dummies. But this is inconsistent with hypothesis 3. Since the license plate format XX-XX-## 
was introduced at the end of trimester 2-91, a plate effect would imply a higher value for cars 
born after that date. The trimester dummies confirm this. 
 
Table 1. Estimation results sample A (dependent variable: ln(price); t-values in parentheses). 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
              I        II      III 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
  Constant         9.36     9.41     9.44 
     (180.1)  (220.7)  (212.7) 
  Age in months      -0.0104    -0.0099      -  
     (-32.4)  (-31.3)                
  Age in years               -        -     -0.1173 
         (-29.7) 
  Engine volume       0.6216     0.6086     0.6187 
       (21.6)        (21.3)    (20.9) 
  Automatic transmission     0.1053     0.1039      0.1000 
            (3.5)    (3.4)    (3.2) 
  Model 205         0.0087     0.0185      0.0205 
            (0.5)      (1.0)    (1.0) 
  Model 309        -0.1226    -0.1123    -0.1123 
       (-5.5)    (-5.0)    (-4.8) 
  Model 405        -0.0181    -0.0090    -0.0035 
           (-0.7)      (-0.4)   (-0.1) 
  Model 605         0.1220     0.1410     0.1439 
            (3.2)    (3.7)    (3.6) 
  New plate          -      0.0490     0.0423 
                      (3.9)    (3.2) 
 Cohort  1
st quarter       -      0.0685    -0.0210 
                   (3.9)   (-1.1) 
 Cohort  2
nd quarter       -      0.0331    -0.0271 
                    (1.7)   (-1.3) 
 Cohort  3
rd quarter       -      0.0110    -0.0228 
                (0.5)    (-1.1) 
  # kilometers driven      -     -0.0017    -0.0018 
                   (-6.2)   (-6.6) 
  ≥100,000 kilometers      -     -0.064    -0.068 
         (-3.1)    (-3.1) 
  Cohort dummies     see fig. 1      -       - 
 
  10,000 kilometer    see fig. 1      -       - 







  The coefficients on the kilometer dummies are depicted in the bottom panel of figure 1. Here, 
we do not expect all these dummies to equal zero, as the number of kilometers itself is not 
included in the regression. In addition to a steady decline in value when the number of kilometers 
increases, the figure shows a strong additional drop in value as soon as the car crosses the 
100,000 kilometer mark. This contradicts hypothesis 2. Remarkably, this drop seems to 
disappear when the number of kilometers increases further. The number of cars offered also 
drops substantially once the 100,000 kilometer threshold has been reached. 
  To put some more structure on the data and formally test our hypotheses, we estimated an 
alternative specification; see column II in table 1. The cohort dummies have been replaced by 
three other variables: age in months, cohort quarter dummies (with the fourth quarter as reference 
category), and a dummy for a new license plate format (i.e. cohort after the second trimester of 
1991). The kilometer dummies have been replaced by a linear kilometer variable and a dummy 
variable for having crossed 100,000 kilometers. 
  Conditional on the time of advertising, age effects and cohort effects are obviously 
tantamount.
 12 In sample B, all cars were advertised at the same point in time, but in sample A the 
time of advertising varies across observations. To control for inflation, changes in market 
conditions, and seasonal effects within sample A, we included dummy variables for the year of 
sale, and dummies for the quarter of sale. However, in preliminary regressions all time of sale 
variables turned out highly (jointly) insignificant. The same holds for dummies for car 
dealer/region and car color. All these variables were omitted henceforth. 
  The cohort quarter dummies are jointly significant and reveal a premium of 6.9, 3.3, and 1.1 
percent for cars from a first, a second, or a third quarter, respectively. As we argued earlier, this 
is consistent with a world in which the age of a car is evaluated in calendar years rather than 
months. When age is defined as the year of sale minus the cohort year, cohort quarter dummies 
are insignificant (column III of table 1). Thus the results for both age specifications imply that 
age in years is closest to consumers’ perception of car age, and that month information is 
ignored, rejecting hypothesis 1. Crossing 100,000 kilometers induces a significant drop in the 
price of the car of almost 7 percent. When replacing the 100,000 km dummy with either a 90,000 
                     
12 Conceptually, cohort and age effects can be different. For example, an individual may prefer a 
younger car to an older but otherwise identical car because the first one has been exposed to moisture for a 
shorter period of time (age effect), or because the first one has (or is thought to have) a higher construction 
quality (cohort effect). However, as cohort and age do not vary independently given the time of advertising, the 





or a 110,000 km dummy, we found that these were not significant. This implies that the sudden 
drop in value is temporary and uniquely related to cars that have run just over 100,000 km, as the 
bottom panel of figure 1 also suggests. It also suggests that the effect we find is not merely due to 
some nonlinearity that is not captured by our linear specification. This rejects hypothesis 2. We 
also find strong evidence against hypothesis 3: the effect of a new license plate format is positive 
and highly significant: A new plate format increases the value of a used car by almost 5 percent. 
We also replaced the new plate dummy (which boils down to a dummy that indicates whether or 
not a car was born after August 1991) with either an August 1990 or an August 1992 dummy. 
When doing so, we found that these were not significant. This implies that the new plate effect is 
especially relevant for cars that were born closely after the change in format. 
  Most of the coefficients on other car characteristics are significant and have the expected 
signs. The value of a car depreciates by one percent each month. An additional deciliter of 
engine volume increases the car’s price by six percent, while the presence of automatic 
transmission induces a ten percent price increase. Driving an additional thousand kilometers 
results in a price decrease of one sixth of a percent. The coefficient for model 309 is negative and 
significant. This may be related to the fact that this model is originally a Talbot which was 
renamed after the Talbot company was acquired by Peugeot. Moreover, the production of the 
309 ceased in 1992. 
   The “new plate” variable may proxy a cohort effect which is unrelated to the introduction of 
the new license plate format but took place at the same time. However, scrutiny of the history of 
all models revealed that in 1991 the only published quality change was the introduction of 
optional power windows and power locks for model 309. Estimation without the observations on 
model 309 resulted in a coefficient of 0.0480 (t-value: 3.5) for the “new plate” variable. The 
result of this check and the estimates in table 1 suggest that the “new plate” dummy indeed 
reflects the effect of the new plate rather than any other cohort effect. 
  Our results may be biased due to the fact that some cars are advertised more than once. To 
investigate this potential problem, we have re-estimated the model without the 84 observations 
that could potentially refer to a car advertised earlier. This does not change the estimation results 







5.3 Results for sample B 
 
The estimation results for sample B are reported in table 2. The much shorter range of cohorts 
allows us to estimate separate cohort effects for bi-monthly periods, rather than four-month 
periods. On the other hand, we have to use 20,000 rather than 10,000 kilometer intervals since in 
sample B there are fewer observations with high mileage. The top panel of figure 2 displays the 
cohort effects. Note that these are not directly comparable to those in the top panel of figure 1. 
Since sample B only contains cars advertised at one point in time we cannot include both the age 
in months and a dummy for each separate cohort in this regression. Thus, we expect the 
coefficients to exhibit a decreasing pattern. 
 
 Table  2.  Estimation results sample B  (dependent variable: ln(price); t-values in parentheses). 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
              I        II        III 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 Constant    10.16   10.80   10.78 
             (17.9)     (133.5)     (134.4) 
  Age in months      -      -0.0916     -  
                (-10.4)          
  Age in years        -      -    -0.1120 
                (-10.5) 
  Engine volume     0.2579   0.2659   0.2664 
     (8.1)      (8.6)   (8.6) 
  Automatic transmission  0.081     0.082   0.079 
     (3.8)   (4.0)   (3.9) 
 Nissan  Primera   -0.6068  -0.6015  -0.6000 
            (-23.5)     (-24.0)     (-24.0) 
 Peugeot  406    -0.5587  -0.5578  -0.5583 
            (-22.15)    (-22.8)      (-22.9) 
  New plate        -     0.0394   0.0378 
                 (1.8)   (1.7) 
 Cohort  1
st quarter     -     0.0367  -0.0464 
                 (2.0)      (-2.4) 
 Cohort  2
nd quarter     -      0.0350  -0.0169 
                  (1.8)      (-0.9) 
 Cohort  3
rd quarter     -       0.0167  -0.0072 
                (0.8)      (-0.4) 
  # kilometers driven    -    -0.0017  -0.0017 
                     (-5.7)      (-5.6) 
  ≥100,000 kilometers    -    -0.032   -0.031 
                 (-1.1)      (-1.1) 
  Cohort dummies   see fig. 2     -      - 
 
  20,000 kilometer   see fig. 2     -      - 
     interval dummies 
 ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  The top panel of figure 2 shows a remarkable spike at the time of the introduction of license 
plate format ##-XX-XX (period 4-99). It also suggests that a change of calendar year is 










































































































































The top panel gives the value of the cohort dummies in the regression in the first column of table 2. Numbers on the 
horizontal axis denote two-month periods. For example, 2-92 refers to the period March-April 1992. The bottom panel 
gives the value of the kilometer dummies in the same regression. In each panel, the straight curve is the estimated one: the 





100,000 kilometer effect in the bottom panel of figure 2 is similar to that in figure 1. Columns II 
and III in table 2 reveal that a new license plate commands a premium of almost 4 percent, 
slightly smaller than the corresponding effect for sample A. Also, the effect is only significant at 
the 10 percent level. The coefficient on the 100,000 kilometers dummy is negative but not 
significant, which may be related to the fact that in sample B only 6 percent of the cars has 
crossed this threshold. The cohort quarter dummies in table 2, second column, show the same 
decreasing pattern as they do in sample A, albeit to a lesser extent. In column three, where age is 
defined in years (ignoring month information), we find a negative effect of the first quarter. 
Finally, the effect of engine volume is much smaller in sample B than in sample A, but the 
effects of automatic transmission and the number of kilometers driven are about equal across the 
two samples.
13 
  Summarizing, we conclude that both samples yield qualitatively similar results, apart from the 
100,000 km. effect. For that effect, we only find some evidence in the older sample. The other 
two hypotheses that we derived from the theory, are rejected in both samples, which implies that 
we have identified some anomalies in the used car market. Yet, in terms of size and significance 




6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper identified price anomalies in the used car market in the Netherlands. First, consumers 
are willing to pay a premium of some 4% for a car that has a license plate from a newer series. 
Second, used cars are priced based on their age in calendar years rather than their age in months. 
Third, we find some evidence that the value of a used car drops once it reaches the 100,000 km 
threshold. These effects are found both in a sample of newspaper advertisements centered around 
                     
13 Sample B contains data for cars that are very diverse: Peugeot 406, Nissan Primera, and Audi A6. To see whether 
this diversity somehow drives our results, we have also done the analysis for just one of the models. Therefore, we 
have also done our analysis for the subsample of Nissan Primeras, for which we have 238 observations, the largest 
number of observations on a single model. The new plate effect is then as large as 8 percent, implying that a new 
plate increases the price of a Nissan Primera by about 2500 guilders (some USD 1000). Given that the new plate 
effect for sample B as a whole is 4 percent, this indicates that there is quite some variation in the size of the license 






the 1991 change in license plate format, and in a sample of price quotes on the Internet centered 
around the 1999 change in license plate format. The effects in the Internet-based sample appear 
weaker, especially that of the 100,000 km. effect. 
  Our results establish that the market for used cars in the Netherlands is not efficient in the 
standard economic sense. There are systematic biases in the prices of used cars, which cannot be 
rationalized by standard economic arguments assuming optimizing behavior. The fact that these 
anomalies exist on this market is all the more surprising since for many people buying a car is 
one of the more important financial decisions they make. One would therefore expect consumers 
to be willing to spend a lot of time, effort, and money to make the right decision. The sums at 
stake are substantial. In sample B, given the average price, a premium of 4% implies a premium 
for a new license plate format of on average Dfl. 1500, or € 680.
14 The fact that people fail to 
make the “right” decision on this market sheds even stronger doubt on the efficiency of markets 
where the amounts at stake are smaller. 
  Our results suggest that at least some consumers are unable or unwilling to use the exact 
information they receive. Instead, they use rough proxies like the year of birth, and whether a car 
has run more or less than 100,000 kilometers. This leads to systematic biases in the prices of 
used cars. For example, cars that are born in the beginning of the year are overpriced, while those 
born in the end of the year are underpriced.  
  Interestingly, consumers do seem to be aware of these anomalies. Indeed, such popular 
wisdom is exactly what triggered this paper in the first place. Also, consumers seem to take 
these effects into account when offering their used car for sale, and when buying a new car. Our 
data suggests that on the used car market, relatively many cars are offered with kilometrage just 
below 100,000. Data from new car registrations show that relatively more cars are born early in 
the year.
15 Hence, even though people make systematic mistakes when evaluating the value of a 
used car, they do seem to have the right view of the price of a used car. 
  One reason that such anomalies may persist in this market, is the impossibility of arbitrage. 
When some market participant is aware of the anomalies that we observe, it is virtually 
                     
14 Note that this is also much higher than what is charged for a vanity license plate in the US. See e.g. Alper et 
al. (1987). 
15 For example, out of all the cars born in the Netherlands in 2001, 13.3% were born in January, and 31.8% 
were born in the first quarter as a whole. For Western Europe as a whole, the effect is less substantial, but still 
existent: in the period 1991-2001, 27.2% of all cars in Western Europe were born in the first quarter of a year, 





impossible to use that information to arbitrage away the inefficiencies. First, transaction costs are 
substantial. Second, arbitrage requires that it is possible to buy cars that are undervalued, to resell 
them at their proper value. But the latter is only possible if one can convince prospective buyers 
that those cars are actually worth more than what they usually trade for.  
  In the case of the plate effect, one could argue that this is merely due to buyers using the 
plate format as a rough short-cut to determine a car’s age. When people only use license plate 
format to evaluate age, one can expect buyers of a used car to overpay for cars that are among 
the first to have a certain format. Yet, we already saw that people also use information on the 
year of birth to determine their willingness to pay for a used car. Once that is used, the 
license plate format does not add any information. Hence, there must be a different reason 
why people are willing to pay more for a new license plate format.  
  Note however that, whereas the year of birth is readily observable for a prospective car 
buyer, it is not for someone observing somebody else’s car. The license plate format, 
however, is readily observable for everyone. That raises the possibility that buyers of used 
cars are willing to pay more for a car with a new plate, not because they themselves use 
information about plate format to evaluate the age of a car, but rather because they expect 
others to do so. Suppose that utility of car owners is decreasing in the age of their car as 
perceived by others. Then it makes sense to pay more for a car that others are more likely to 
perceive as being relatively young. When those others use the license plate format as a rough 
proxy for the age of a car, then they will perceive a car with a new license plate format as 
being relatively young. Hence, car owners are willing to pay more for such a car.  
  Arguably, this is a Veblen effect. Veblen effects are said to exist when one good is sold at a 
premium relative to a second good that is functionally equivalent; see e.g. Bagwell and Bernheim 
(1996).
16 Veblen (1899) refers to that premium as conspicuous waste, that part of the value of a 
good that cannot be accounted for by the intrinsic usefulness of the good. Theoretical analyses of 
Veblen effects include Ireland (1994, 1998) and Glazer and Konrad (1996). The model that is 
most closely related to our plate effect is Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). They derive conditions 
where a good that is functionally equivalent to another one can still command a premium if 
consumers use consumption of that good to signal their wealth. 
                     
16 Some papers (see for example Corneo and Jeanne (1997)) define a Veblen effect as a case in which demand is 
increasing in price. However, we think that the definition of Bagwell and Bernheim is much closer to the spirit of 





  The effects we find in sample B are smaller, both in size and significance, than those in 
sample A. One possible explanation is the following. The cars considered in the Internet 
sample are born much later than the cars in the newspaper sample. Therefore, these cars may 
have a higher intrinsic quality and therefore, other things equal, fetch a higher price in the used 
car market. The relative effect of a new license plate and crossing the 100,000 kilometer mark 
may then be lower. Note from tables 4 and 5 in the appendix that the average price in sample B is 
twice as high as the average price in sample A. Since the relative license plate effect found for 
sample B is more than half as large as that found for sample A, this still implies that the absolute 
license plate effect in sample B is higher than the one in sample A. 
  An alternative explanation for the smaller effects in sample B is that the market for used 
cars may have become more efficient. There are two reasons why that may be the case. First, 
due to the introduction of the Internet, it is much easier for consumers to look around and 
compare prices, reducing the scope for the anomalies we identify in this paper. Second, an 
increase in market efficiency may be due to this very research. Note that the new plate in 
sample B concerns the change in format that took place in June 1999, while the one in sample 
A concerns the change in September 1991. An earlier version of this paper, with only the 
results for sample A, was published in Dutch in June 1999 – only a few weeks after the most 
recent format change (Haan and Kooreman, 1999). This generated a lot of media attention, 
with dozens of newspapers reporting on our results, many of them including the advice to 
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Table 3. Sample A: Sample statistics.
a        
__________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      mean  st.  dev.  min.  max. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Price (Dfl.
b)      18511  8575  4700  69950 
Age in months      47.7  24.9   6  114   
Age in years
c    3.80  2.06    0    9 
# kilometers driven (x0.001)  71.9  42.6   4   196       
100,000 kilometers or more  0.249 
Engine volume (liters)    1.447 0.332 1.0  3.0 
Automatic transmission    0.035 
 
Year car cohort      90.81  2.21  86  97 
Cohort 1
st  quarter    0.526 
Cohort 2
nd  quarter    0.219 
Cohort 3
rd  quarter    0.158 
Cohort 4
th  quarter    0.097 
  
Year of sale
d      94.61  2.12  92   98 
Sale in 1
st quarter    0.227 
Sale in 2
nd quarter    0.305 
Sale in 3
rd quarter    0.314 
Sale in 4
th quarter    0.154 
 
Peugeot  106     0.126 
Peugeot  205     0.327 
Peugeot  309     0.182 
Peugeot  405     0.305 
Peugeot  605     0.061 
 
New  plate     0.368 
(cohort after August 1991)   
____________________________________________________________________ 
a# of observations: 462. 
bThe value of the Dutch Guilder varied between US$ 0.47 and US$ 0.62 during the sample period. 
cYear of sale minus cohort year. 





Table 4. Sample B: sample statistics.
a        
____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      mean  st.  dev.  min.  max. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Price (Dfl.
b)       37168 14895 13950 121745 
Age in months      30.8  10.5   2  48 
Age in years
c    1.90  0.828    0    3 
# kilometers driven (x0.001)  49.6  30.0   1.5  207       
100,000 kilometers or more  0.063  
Engine volume (liters)    1.88  0.259 1.6  2.8 
Automatic transmission    0.104 
 
Cohort  1997     0.182 
Cohort  1998     0.293 
Cohort  1999     0.293 
Cohort  2000     0.114 
 
Cohort 1
st  quarter    0.429 
Cohort 2
nd  quarter    0.257 
Cohort 3
rd  quarter    0.199 
Cohort 4
th  quarter    0.115 
 
Nissan  Primera    0.537 
Peugeot  406     0.332 
Audi  A6     0.131 
 
New  plate     0.167 
(cohort after May 1999)   
____________________________________________________________________ 
aTime of advertising: first two weeks of 2001; # of observations: 443. 
bThe value of the Dutch Guilder was approximately US$ 0.43 at the time of advertising. 
c2000 minus cohort year. 


























































































































































































































































The top panel gives the frequencies of the different cohorts in sample A. Numbers on the horizontal axis denote trimesters. 
For example, 2-92 refers to the period May-August 1992. The bottom panel gives the frequencies of the different kilometer 















































The top panel gives the frequencies of the different cohorts in sample B. Numbers on the horizontal axis denote two-month 
periods. For example, 2-92 refers to the period March-April 1992. The bottom panel gives the frequency of the different 
kilometer intervals in sample B.
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